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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
~ Rule 24(a)(7) 
A statement of the case* The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the 
record . . . . 
~ Rule 24(e) 
References in briefs to the record. References 
shall be made to the pages of the original record as 
paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of the reporter's 
transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) 
or 11(g). References to exhibits shall include exhibit 
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of 
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, 
offered, and received or rejected. 
~ Rule 33(b) 
Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that 
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the 
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wasatch moves to strike the entire Appelleefs Brief. 
Appellee's Brief contains references to burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial matters which were not 
previously made a part of the trial record. Under Rule 24(k) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Practice, briefs which are not 
"free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous 
matters" may be "stricken or disregarded." The insertion of 
Appendices A, D and I into Appellee's Brief violate 
Rule 24(k). The Court should strike the Appelleefs Brief in 
its entirety. 
Erickson has implied in his Brief that Wasatch has 
acted improperly and misstated facts to the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals, and that the Order in Limine was based on 
misstatements of fact. First, this issue was not raised at any 
time during the proceedings before the Third District Court, 
and cannot now be decided by the Court of Appeals as a matter 
of first instance. Even if the Court of Appeals were to decide 
this issue, Wasatch1s position is that Wasatch acted in good 
faith throughout the entire proceedings below and also in 
bringing this appeal. It is unclear how Wasatch could possibly 
mislead the trial court, or for that matter the Court of 
Appeals, when it has supported the statements made in the 
memoranda prepared below and in the Brief filed on appeal with 
specific references to the depositions of the county employees, 
and other relevant portions of the trial record. If facts had 
been misstated to the trial court during Wasatch's Motion in 
Limine, it was the obligation of counsel for Erickson to inform 
the court of such misstatements at that time, or at least at 
some point during the trial proceedings. Furthermore, 
Judge Wilkinson's Ruling on Erickson's Motion to Reconsider the 
Order in Limine indicates that he was changing the prior Order 
due to the change of testimony of the county employees and not 
because of any alleged misstatements. 
Wasatch was legitimately surprised by the admission 
of the county employees' testimony. Wasatch had moved for an 
Order in Limine excluding their testimony. Having obtained 
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that Order, Wasatch had a right and obligation to rely upon the 
Order. The admission of the testimony of these witnesses 
constituted surprise to Wasatch for several reasons: (1) These 
witnesses had changed their prior deposition testimony which 
had revealed that they either could not recall the dates of 
their prior and subsequent falls or that their falls were 
remote in time to that of Erickson's fall; (2) they changed 
their prior deposition testimony that they did not report their 
falls to anyone at Wasatch Manor; (3) this testimony was 
admitted despite the fact that the standards set by the prior 
Order in Limine for the admissibility of this testimony had not 
been met by Erickson; and (4) Wasatch did not learn that the 
witnesses had changed their testimony until the very last day 
of trial, just three to four hours before the case was 
submitted to the jury for decision. 
Wasatch's appeal is based upon two independent and 
alternative grounds; first that the trial court erred in 
admitting surprise testimony and second that the court further 
erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 20. This appeal is well 
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. Thus, the 
appeal is not frivolous and does not warrant a grant of 
attorneys fees to Erickson. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE APPELLEE'S BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN, BECAUSE IT 
IT CONTAINS IMPROPER REFERENCES TO IMMATERIAL, 
IRRELEVANT, BURDENSOME AND PREJUDICIAL MATTERS. 
WHICH ARE NOT PART OF THE TRIAL RECORD. 
Wasatch moves to strike the Appellee's Brief in its 
entirety. In his extensive, yet largely irrelevant 
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Statement of Facts and Summary of Argument, Erickson has 
referred to and attached as Appendices two letters from 
Erickson1s counsel to counsel for Wasatch. See Appellee's 
Brief at pp. 12, 21, Appendices A, and D. The Appellee's Brief 
also contains the Affidavit of plaintiff-respondent Guy 
Erickson. See Appellee's Brief at p. 49 and Appendix I. 
These documents were never made a part of the trial record. In 
fact, Appendices D and I were documents that were generated 
during the appeal process. Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Practice requires that all statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below be supported by citations 
to the record. Furthermore, Rule 24(e) specifies that 
references shall be made to the pages of the original record, 
or to the pages of the reporter's transcript. The attachment 
of Appendices A, D and I to Appellee's Brief has rendered the 
Brief violative of Rules 24(a)(7) and Rule 24(e). 
Furthermore, the insertion of the above documents 
into Appellee's Brief is a blatant attempt to affect the 
outcome of the appeal by improper facts and inferences that 
have nothing to do with the legal issues raised by Wasatch's 
appeal. Appendices A, D and I are mere attempts to confuse the 
issues and to insert improper and sensitive information into 
this appeal. 
In particular, Wasatch objects to Appendix I of 
Appellee's Brief, which is the Affidavit of Guy Erickson. 
First, the Affidavit does not meet the procedural requirements 
of an Affidavit, because it contains argumentative statements 
rather than facts based upon the affiant's personal knowledge. 
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(See para, 3 of Appendix I to Appellee's Brief.) Secondly, 
the Affidavit attempts to generate sympathy, passion and 
prejudice against Wasatch by stating that Erickson was 
wrongfully evicted, and that he is destitute. Thus, the 
Affidavit attempts to incite the sympathy and passion of the 
Court. It is prejudicial to Wasatch, and taints the entire 
brief of Appellee. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that 
briefs which are not in compliance with the rules provided 
therein may be disregarded or stricken. Rule 24(k) provides: 
All briefs under this Rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged 
with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not 
in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court, and the court may assess attorney 
fees against the offending lawyer. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied Rule 24(k) to strike an 
entire reply brief in Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah 
App. 1989). In that case, Thomas Maughan had petitioned for 
modification of the divorce decree granting custody of his 
four-year-old son to the child's mother. The trial court 
denied the Petition for a Modification, and increased Thomas 
Maughanfs monthly child support payments. On appeal, Thomas 
Maughan included in his reply brief documents supporting his 
argument that he had suffered a loss of income from farming 
activities. 770 P.2d at 161, fn. 1. The respondent, 
Mrs. Maughan, moved to strike the supporting documents, because 
they were not previously admitted into evidence. Id. The 
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Utah Court of Appeals granted the Motion to Strike, stating 
that "all briefs which are not free from irrelevant or 
immaterial matter may be 'disregarded or stricken.1" Id., 
citing R. Utah Ct. App. 24(k). 
Erickson1s Brief contains documents which are 
"irrelevant" and "immaterial" to the consideration of the 
issues on appeal, and contain "scandalous" matters which are 
inserted simply to generate sympathy on the part of the Court. 
Under the authority of Maughan v. Maughan, and Rule 24(k) 
Wasatch Manor respectfully requests the Court to disregard and 
strike the Appellee's Brief in its entirety, or at the least, 
those portions of the Appellee's Brief which refer to the 
above-mentioned documents that have not previously been made 
part of the trial record. 
POINT II: THE ORDER IN LIMINE WAS NOT BASED ON 
MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT. 
For the first time, on appeal, Erickson has argued 
that the Order in Limine excluding the testimony of the 
three county employees was based on misstatements of fact. 
First, it is Wasatch's position that this matter was not raised 
by Erickson at any time during the trial court proceedings, and 
cannot properly be determined on appeal. Erickson waived this 
issue by failing to raise it during the trial court 
proceedings. He cannot now raise this issue on appeal. 
Even if the Court of Appeals was inclined to 
determine this issue, the Order in Limine was not based on any 
misstatements of fact. Erickson argues that at the time of 
Wasatch's Motion in Limine, counsel for Wasatch misrepresented 
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facts in two ways. First, it is argued that counsel did not 
inform the court of Wasatch's defense that Wasatch Manor 
employees cleared the snow and ice on the date in question as 
they always did pursuant to their habit and routine. 
Appellee's Brief at p. 20. Thus, Erickson argues that the 
trial court should have been informed of the "routine" 
defense. Wasatch's response to this rather vague argument is 
that Wasatch's counsel did not purposely or strategically leave 
out any information regarding the "routine" defense in its 
arguments to the court. Furthermore, if Erickson's counsel 
believed that counsel for Wasatch was omitting material facts 
that were relevant to the trial court's determination of the 
Motion in Limine, it was his duty to inform the court of any 
such facts. In fact, Erickson's counsel did point out the 
"routine" defense to Judge Wilkinson during oral argument on 
the Motion in Limine. Counsel for Erickson stated to the court: 
"The defense has no one who knows anything 
about what they did on the day Mr. Erickson 
fell. All they can say is that they had a 
course of conduct, and that their course of 
conduct was to habitually go out at certain 
predetermined times every night and sand as 
a result of their knowledge of this 
dangerous condition . . • the defense is 
going to say we salt every time every night 
because we are aware of the freeze/thaw 
kind of cycle. 
(R. 444 at 14). Thus, the trial court was informed of the 
"routine" defense, and nevertheless granted the Motion in 
Limine. 
Erickson further argues that counsel for Wasatch made 
misrepresentations or misstatements to the effect that none of 
the three county employees fell in the "depressed area" of the 
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Wasatch Manor parking lot. Appelleefs Brief at pp. 20-22. In 
the Memorandum in Support of Wasatch's Motion in Limine, 
Wasatch expressly cited to the relevant portions of the county 
employees1 depositions, and summarized their testimony 
regarding their prior and subsequent falls. It is unclear how 
Wasatch could possibly mislead the court when all of its 
arguments and statements of fact were supported by references 
to the depositions of the witnesses. 
If Erickson believed that ?atch was misrepresenting 
the facts, it was incumbent upon his Dunsel to clarify the 
record and notify Judge Wilkinson about any misstatements that 
were allegedly made by Wasatchfs counsel. However, Ericksonfs 
counsel did not object to Wasatch's characterization of the 
evidence as stated in Wasatch's Memorandum or as stated by 
Wasatch's counsel during oral argument on that Motion. Indeed, 
at the time of the oral argument on the Motion in Limine, 
Erickson's counsel agreed with Wasatch's statement of facts. 
Counsel for Erickson stated to the court: 
"Last but not least, I think the Court 
has heard a fairly good rendition of the 
facts in this case between two counsel. 
(R. 444 at 16). 
Furthermore, Erickson failed to later challenge the 
Order in Limine on the grounds that it was improperly 
obtained. At no time during the trial court proceedings did 
Erickson's counsel indicate to the trial court that its Order 
in Limine was based on misstatements of fact. Erickson's 
references to ambiguous and innocuous testimony in his Brief on 
appeal cannot correct his failure to raise this issue prior to 
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this appeal. The trial court was informed by the two parties 
of all the then-existing facts, and accordingly entered its 
Ruling granting Wasatch's Motion and excluding the testimony of 
the county employees. 
POINT III: WASATCH WAS SUBJECTIVELY AND REASONABLY 
SURPRISED AT TRIAL. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the ground 
rules and guidelines for preparation of a case for trial. 
These rules contain provisions for discovery, designation of 
witnesses, motions in limine, and pre-trial orders in order to 
prevent trial by ambush and generate fair trials for all 
parties. (Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 
(1967)(The purpose of discovery rules are to make discovery as 
simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any unnecessary 
technicalities, and to remove elements of surprise or trickery 
so that the parties and the court can determine the facts and 
resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as 
possible.) Wasatch followed these rules of procedure in 
deposing the county employees, moving for an order in limine 
excluding such testimony, and thereafter relied upon that Order 
in preparing its defense. If Wasatch were not entitled to rely 
upon the Order, the Rules of Civil Procedure allowing for broad 
discovery, motions in limine, pre-trial orders, etc. would be 
superfluous and serve no purpose. 
The scope of Judge Wilkinsonfs Order was clear. The 
testimony of the county employees would not be admitted unless 
it could be shown that there was a defect in the construction 
or design of the Wasatch Manor parking lot, and that the 
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witnesses1 prior and subsequent falls occurred within the same 
time period and the same area of the parking lot as that of 
Erickson1s fall. (R. 443, at 20-23.) After the trial court 
ruled on the Motion in Limine, counsel for Erickson requested a 
clarification of the Ruling. He specifically stated to the 
court that he did not intend to introduce evidence showing that 
the parking lot was defectively constructed, but he intended to 
show that the parking lot presented a dangerous condition 
because of Wasatch's negligence. (R. 444 at 23.) However, 
Judge Wilkinson ruled that Erickson could not compel the 
admission of the testimony by showing negligence on the part of 
Wasatch. That exchange was as follows: 
Mr. Bjorklund: We do not intend at this 
point in time to introduce evidence showing 
that it [the parking lot] was defectively 
constructed, but that the maintenance of 
the parking lot in terms of piling the snow 
around the perimeter and the subsequent 
salting could—created an on-going 
dangerous condition. Now, I understand the 
Court's ruling is a dangerous condition 
regarding the construction. We are saying, 
okay, it's a parking lot that's constructed 
the way it is. Their negligence was piling 
the snow the way they did all the way 
through the winter and failing to salt. 
Does that fall within the same kind of 
dangerous condition? 
The Court: No. I could not allow that of 
where you talk of a fall of 15, 10, 15, 18 
years ago. There is no way that it can be 
tied in that that was plowed the same way 
and the same type of conditions existed. 
And I would not allow it. Does that clear 
it up? Id^ 
As a result of the Order in Limine, Wasatch did not 
expect the testimony of these witnesses to be admitted unless 
Erickson called an expert witness at trial to testify regarding 
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the defective design or structure of the parking lot. However, 
Erickson failed to proffer any testimony regarding the 
construction of the parking lot. Thus, Wasatch was surprised 
that the trial court would reconsider its Order and allow the 
testimony into evidence despite the fact that the standards in 
the prior Order had not been met. Wasatch was surprised 
because it did not know why the ladies had changed their 
testimony, what the new testimony of the witnesses would be, 
what questions to ask on cross-examination, and what answers 
would be generated by cross-examination of the ladies. 
Wasatch was particularly surprised with the ladies1 
testimony regarding Wasatch's notice of the alleged dangerous 
condition of the parking lot. At the time of their 
depositions, the three county employees testified that they did 
not report their falls to Wasatch Manor employees, or could not 
recall whether they reported their falls to Wasatch Manor. (R. 
438 at 7, 11; R. 439 at 11; R. 441 at 13, 16, 18.) During the 
oral argument on the Motion in Limine, counsel for Wasatch 
indicated to the court his understanding that due to the 
testimony of these witnesses, there was no claim being made 
that Wasatch had notice of the prior falls. Mr. Hayes stated: 
Not one of them, not one of them claim ever 
giving notice to Wasatch Manor or its 
employees or its manager or anybody that 
they had fallen on the parking lot or that 
they considered it was dangerous to them. 
So that issue of notice, I think, is 
agreed. There is no claim in this matter 
that these people that he wants to call in 
the case claim some kind of notice to 
Wasatch Manor . . . . There is no claim in 
this case, and if there is, it's news to 
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me, that any of these people claim to 
have given notice to Wasatch Manor. 
(R. 444 at 4-5, 8.) 
Counsel for Erickson did not at that time, or at any 
time prior to the third day of the trial inform counsel for 
Wasatch that a claim for prior notice would be made against 
Wasatch. Ericksonfs Brief admits that Ms. Helms and 
Ms. Christensen testified in their depositions that they had 
not reported their falls to Wasatch Manor. (Appellee's Brief 
at p. 26.) Erickson1s attempt to distinguish between "report" 
and "communicate" fails, because that is a distinction without 
a difference. 
A further element of the surprise experienced by 
Wasatch is that Wasatch did not know until the very last day of 
trial that there was a change in testimony. On the other hand, 
evidence indicates, and Erickson admits, that counsel for 
Erickson knew as far back as three weeks prior to the trial 
that there might be a change in testimony. (R. 446 at 77; 
Appellee's Brief at p. 27.) Nevertheless, Erickson's counsel 
failed to inform the court or counsel for Wasatch of this new 
information. Erickson claims that his counsel had no 
obligation to be "clairvoyant," and to conduct discovery on 
behalf of Wasatch. Erickson fails to recognize his counsel's 
obligation as an officer of the court to supplement discovery 
and to prevent surprise, trickery, or trial by ambush. 
Furthermore, Wasatch's counsel had properly conducted 
its discovery. There was no obligation, and certainly no 
reason, for Wasatch's counsel to continue questioning the 
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county employees where the Order in Limine specifically 
excluded their testimony. Certainly, if Erickson had 
designated someone who would testify regarding the alleged 
defective construction of the parking lot, it would have been 
necessary for Wasatch to depose and question that witness in 
order to prepare its defense. That particular situation was 
within the realm of the Order in Limine. However, in light of 
the Order, there was no logical reason to further question the 
county employees. 
POINT IV; ERICKSON'S CONDUCT RESULTED IN TRIAL BY AMBUSH. 
The surprise suffered by Wasatch occurred during 
the three weeks after Ericksonfs counsel learned of the 
change in testimony, yet failed to inform Wasatch of this 
development. The only reason that one can possibly imagine for 
this failure to inform Wasatch is that Erickson and/or his 
counsel were attempting to conduct this trial by ambush. 
Erickson argues in his Brief that Wasatch's alleged 
misstatements and omissions forced Erickson to wait until the 
last day of trial to request the court to reconsider the Order 
in Limine. Even if Erickson was correct in his argument that 
the Order was based on misstatements and omissions, Erickson 
still had a duty to supplement discovery and inform Wasatch of 
the new testimony, and Erickson had the opportunity to 
challenge the propriety of the Order during the three weeks 
prior to the trial after he learned of the change in testimony. 
Rather, what seems to have happened is that counsel 
for Erickson knew that the ladies would change their testimony 
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even at the time of oral argument on the Motion in Limine. At 
that time, counsel for Erickson, Mr. Bjorklund, stated to the 
court: 
The ladies, when they were called to these 
depositions had not talked to me at all. I 
had not prepared them. I had not asked 
them to go to their diaries. I had not 
asked them to talk to their friends or do 
anything else that they might otherwise do 
to refresh their recollection. They came 
into those depositions absolutely cold. 
(R. 444 at 16.) Suspecting that Mr. Bjorklund was not 
revealing all that he knew, counsel for Wasatch, Mr. Hayes, 
demanded that any new information be divulged. Mr. Hayes 
stated: 
Now, if I am getting the suspicion that he 
expects these women to testify differently 
than they did in their deposition, if 
that's the case, he should have come here 
armed today with affidavits to say so, to 
ask the Court to do it on the come, so to 
speak, and wait and see what happens. I 
don't think it is fair to the Court, and 
it's not fair to me to say that these women 
are going to testify differently and put it 
all in a period of '84/'85. Because they 
clearly did not do that in their 
depositions. 
* * * * * * 
If counsel intends to put on or thinks that 
there is going to be evidence that's 
sufficient to lay a proper foundation, I 
think he is obligated at this point to make 
a record of it and tell us what that is 
going to be, and make some kind of 
proffer. Otherwise, I don't think he can 
argue that it's going to come and counsel 
should be ready when he hears it to try 
to cross-examine the witnesses with. 
(R. 444 at 17-19.) 
Counsel for Erickson did not at that time, or at any 
time prior to the trial, make the proffer demanded by Wasatch. 
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On the third day of trial, however, Erickson moved the court to 
reconsider the Order in Limine, claiming that the witnesses had 
changed their testimony, because they had, in fact, consulted 
their diaries, journals, calendars, and friends. Judge 
Wilkinson specifically relied on this changed testimony in 
reaching his decision to reverse his prior Order in Limine and 
admit the testimony of the three county employees. The judge 
expressly stated that he would have to admit the testimony, 
because the witnesses had brought their falls within the same 
relative time period as the fall of Erickson. (R. 446 at 
55-56.) Had Erickson made his Motion three weeks prior to the 
trial when he obtained the new information, or at any time 
during the three weeks prior to trial, Judge Wilkinson could 
have changed his Order, but at least Wasatch would have had 
time to prepare for the new evidence. 
POINT V; THE TESTIMONY OF THE COUNTY EMPLOYEES WAS NOT 
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY. 
Rebuttal evidence is properly deemed to be evidence 
which is relevant only by virtue of evidence deduced by the 
adverse party. Its function is to explain or rebut the 
evidence introduced by the adverse party — not mainly to 
support the parties1 case-in-chief. Wells v. CM. Mays Lumber 
Co.f Inc., 754 P.2d 888, 889 (Okla. App. 1987). Rebuttal 
witnesses are those persons the necessity of whose testimony 
reasonably cannot be anticipated before the time of trial. 
Wirth v. Commercial Lease Resources, Inc., 96 N.M. 340, 630 
P.2d 292, 298 (1981). The party who has the affirmative burden 
of proof is required to produce the first evidence on an issue, 
-15-
and at that time should produce'all his evidence in chief. 
Then, after his adversary has produced all his evidence, the 
former should be confined to rebuttal evidence, or evidence 
which tends to answer or explain his adversary's evidence. 
Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11, 395 P.2d 25, 26 (1964). 
In Wells, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that 
the admission of a tape-recorded conversation between the 
appellants was not admissible as rebuttal evidence. In that 
case, Wells contracted with Richardson to act as a foreman and 
supervise the construction of Well's home. Wells later brought 
an action against Richardson and the company from whom 
Richardson obtained the building materials, alleging that the 
defendants were improperly overcharging Wells for the 
materials. 754 P.2d at 889. On the final day of trial, after 
the defense had rested, the trial court allowed Wells to reopen 
the case and present as rebuttal evidence a tape-recorded 
conversation between Wells and an employee of the defendant in 
which the employee admitted his guilt. Id. The 
tape-recording was not listed on the pre-trial order as an 
exhibit. Wells claimed that this was due to the fact that he 
was either unaware of it or had forgotten about it. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that the 
tape-recording should have properly been offered as evidence as 
part of Well's case-in-chief, rather than as rebuttal evidence, 
because it obviously went to the major premise of Well's 
argument. Id. The court held that regardless of whether 
Wells knew of the tape-recording prior to the last day of 
trial, he should have known about it. The court further held: 
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Presentation of the tape on the last day of 
trial without Defendant's prior knowledge 
that such tape existed was not only 
violative of pre-trial discovery 
requirements, but it also constituted 
harmful surprise and was clearly 
unfairly prejudicial to Defendant's case. 
754 P.2d at 890. 
Similarly in Wirth, the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
held that the testimony of a witness not previously included in 
the pre-trial order did not constitute "rebuttal" testimony. 
Because the witness1 testimony was intended to discredit the 
plaintiff's credibility, the New Mexico court held that the 
testimony was part of the planned case of the defense, and it 
was not rebuttal testimony which was reasonably unanticipated 
prior to the time of trial. 630 P.2d at 298. 
In the present case, the testimony of the county 
employees was not true rebuttal testimony. First, the 
testimony of these ladies was offered by Erickson during his 
case-in-chief. At that time, Wasatch had not even begun to 
present its defense. Although Erickson called as adverse 
witnesses two employees of Wasatch, Wasatch's counsel did not 
question these witnesses until after the testimony of 
Ms. Helms, Ms. Christensen, and Ms. Mark was presented to the 
jury. Thus, the testimony of these ladies was not introduced 
to rebut the evidence presented by Wasatch. Furthermore, the 
testimony was reasonably anticipated prior to the time of 
trial. In fact, the ladies' testimony, like that of the 
witness in Wirth, was intended to discredit the credibility 
of Wasatch's witnesses. Thus, this testimony was a part of 
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Ericksonfs planned prosecution or case-in-chief, and was not 
rebuttal testimony. 
It would be against policy considerations to allow 
this testimony to come in as rebuttal testimony when Wasatch 
has previously relied upon the court's Order that the testimony 
would not be admissible unless the guidelines established in 
the Order were met. To allow this to occur in this case would 
be in total contradiction to the purposes of the rules of civil 
procedure and an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court did not indicate at any time during 
its Ruling on Erickson's Motion to Reconsider the Order in 
Limine state that he would admit the testimony on the grounds 
that it constituted rebuttal testimony. Rather, the court 
indicated that its decision to admit the testimony was based on 
the change in testimony. (R. 446 at 56.) 
POINT VI: THE TESTIMONY OF THE COUNTY EMPLOYEES AFFECTED 
THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL. 
Erickson has argued in his Brief that the testimony 
of the county employees did not change the outcome of the 
trial. At this point it is pure speculation how this testimony 
affected the jury at arriving at its verdict. However, had the 
courts original Order in Limine been enforced, there would 
have been no witnesses to testify regarding the alleged prior 
slip and fall accidents on the Wasatch Manor parking lot, and 
there would have been no one to testify that Wasatch Manor had 
prior notice that people had fallen on the parking lot and/or 
that the lot was dangerous. However, at trial, they not only 
testified that they reported their falls, but further 
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identified Art Kersey as the Wasatch Manor employee to whom 
they reported their falls. (R. 446 at 63-63, 89.) 
POINT VII: WASATCH SUFFICIENTLY OBJECTED TO THE ADMISSION 
OF THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY AND PROPERLY PRESERVED 
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL ITS ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE. 
In April 1989, Judge Wilkinson heard oral argument 
on Wasatch1s Motion in Limine, requesting that the testimony 
of three county employees be declared inadmissible. By Order 
dated May 10, 1989, the court granted this Motion. The case 
proceeded to trial, and the admissibility of the testimony was 
again raised, this time by Erickson's Motion for 
Reconsideration. Wasatch accordingly objected to the admission 
of this testimony in oral argument on the Motion to 
Reconsider. Thus, Wasatch objected at trial in accordance with 
Utah law, and preserved its right to challenge the Court's 
admission of the surprise testimony. 
That Wasatch properly preserved its right to 
challenge the admission evidence is supported by Utah Rules of 
Evidence 103(a)(1). Utah Rules of Evidence 103(a)(1) states: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, 
and 
(1) in case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, 
stating the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Wasatch's objection was timely in that it was raised as soon as 
Erickson moved for reconsideration of the Court's Order. 
The rationale for the rule that objections regarding 
admission of evidence must be raised at trial was outlined in 
-19-
State v, Lesley. 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). The Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Prior to trial, a judge is often in a 
disadvantaged position to decide on the 
admissibility of evidence. The trial judge 
is likely to have a more complete view of 
the grounds for excluding or admitting 
certain evidence. When defense counsel 
fails to call the trial judge's attention 
to any problems regarding the admissibility 
of evidence at the time it is offered, he 
or she deprives the trial court of an 
opportunity to avoid error in the trial 
which may nave been created by an improper 
ruling on a pre-trial motion based on 
inadequate information. (Emphasis added.) 
672 P.2d at 82. The court further stated: 
The only requirement is that any 
objections to evidence be made known to 
the trial judge so that he or she can make 
an informed decision to admit or exclude 
it. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 82 n. 1. 
In the trial of this matter, Mr. Hayes, counsel for 
Wasatch, complied with the holdings of State v. Lesley and 
State v. Holyoak, 743 P.2d 791 (Utah App. 1987). Mr. Hayes 
made his objection to the testimony of the three county 
employees "known to the trial judge." Unlike the facts 
presented in State v. Lesley and State v. Holyoak, Wasatch 
does not simply rely on its pre-trial Motion in Limine in 
arguing that it properly objected to the admission of 
testimony. Rather, Wasatch points out that on the third day of 
trial, in oral argument on Erickson's Motion to reconsider, 
Mr. Hayes objected to the admission of such testimony based on 
surprise. Thus Mr. Hayes1 objection was made at trial, and 
before the trial judge. Mr. Hayes1 objection brought to 
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Judge Wilkinson's attention the problems associated with 
admitting such testimony into evidence. The trial court had 
the opportunity to avoid error* According to State v. 
Lesley, the purposes of Utah Rules of Evidence 103(a)(1) have 
been met. 
POINT VIII: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING WASATCH1S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Wasatch appealed on the grounds that the court erred 
in admitting surprise testimony/ and in giving Jury 
Instruction No. 20. These are alternative and independent 
grounds for the appeal. However, their effect is cumulative in 
that they both resulted in prejudice to Wasatch. As more fully 
briefed in Point III of the Corrected Appellants Brief, it is 
Wasatch's opinion that the trial court "transgressed any 
reasonable bounds of discretion" in denying Wasatch's Motion 
for a New Trial. See Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 201 
(Utah 1981); Hyland v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 
427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967). The trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to order a new trial to Wasatch who was 
genuinely and severely surprised when the trial court, on the 
very last day of trial, reversed its own prior Order in Limine, 
thereby allowing into evidence crucial testimony against 
Wasatch for which Wasatch had no opportunity to prepare. 
The trial court further abused its discretion by 
giving Jury Instruction No. 20 which misstated the standard of 
care that a landlord must exercise toward a tenant. As more 
fully briefed in Point II of the Corrected Appellant's Brief, 
Utah law does not impose upon the landlord any duty beyond that 
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of the exercise of ordinary care to maintain its premises in a 
reasonably safe condition for its tenants and guests. 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 
App. 1988); Schofield v. Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427 511 P.2d 
149, 151 (1973). The law does not impose on the landlord a 
"further duty" to observe dangerous conditions known to him, or 
which reasonable diligence would reveal, and to take reasonable 
steps to remedy or remove those dangerous conditions. However, 
this "further duty" was improperly included in Jury Instruction 
No. 20. 
Contrary to Erickson's accusations, Wasatch did not 
intend to mislead the Court of Appeals that Jury Instruction 
No. 20 merely contained objectional language. In fact, 
Wasatch's Brief cited what it considered to be the 
objectionable part of Jury Instruction No. 20, and attached the 
entire Jury Instruction as Appendix C to its Brief. (See 
also Corrected Appellant's Brief at p. 31.) 
The Cornwell v. Barton, 18 Utah 2d 325, 422 P.2d 
663 (1967) case relied upon by Erickson did in fact approve of 
an instruction such as the portions of Instruction No. 20 to 
which Wasatch objects. Although that case has not been 
overturned, the more recent cases on landlord tenant liability 
do not impose any "additional duties." It is Wasatch's 
position that these recent cases, such as Gregory v. 
Fourthwest Investments, and Schofield, established the 
proper standard of care to be applied to a landlord. 
In the most recent case on the standard to be applied 
to a landlord, Gregory v. Fourthwest, the Utah Court of 
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Appeals cited Martin v Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 
(Utah 1977) with approval. As previously briefed, Martin v. 
Safeway Stores rejected an instruction like that of 
Instruction No. 20 in this case, and held that it is not the 
duty of persons in control of buildings to mop the sidewalks 
dry or to take other steps necessary to prevent the 
accumulation of moisture on the sidewalk, and they do not have 
a duty to seek out and mop dry all such depressions in the 
walkways. 565 P.2d at 1140-41. 
Jury Instruction No. 20 was improperly given. The 
fact that the trial court instructed the jury as to the proper 
standard of care required of a landlord after it had given 
the incorrect standard of care does not cure the improper 
instruction, nor does it render the instruction proper and 
non-objectionable. It is likely that in its absence, a 
reasonable jury would find that Wasatch had met its standard of 
care under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal was properly brought by Wasatch. The law 
does not support a grant of attorneyfs fees in this case. 
The standard in determining whether a party has brought a 
frivolous appeal is set out in Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. That rule states that a frivolous appeal 
is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or 
reverse the existing law. See also O'Brien v. Rush, 744 
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987). However, sanctions for 
frivolous appeals should only be applied in "egregious cases, 
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lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
erroneous lower court decisions," Porco v. Porco# 752 P. 2d 
365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). 
Erickson's suggestion that the appeal is frivolous is 
nothing but ludicrous hype. As obviously shown in two briefs, 
the appeal is not frivolous. Wasatch not only has a legitimate 
right but obligation under the law to appeal the admission of 
surprise testimony, particularly where the surprise was due to 
the trial court's sudden reversal of its own Order upon which 
Wasatch relied. Furthermore, Wasatch's appeal regarding Jury 
Instruction No. 20 is supported by case law indicating that the 
instruction was not a proper statement of the law. 
For the foregoing reasons Wasatch respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the trial court's Judgment, or in 
the alternative, remand this case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of July, 1990. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
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MASUDA A. MEDCALF J J 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Wasatch Manor, Inc. 
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